Schürmann, Reiner. 2003. Broken Hegemonies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Translated by Reginald Lilly from the French Des hégémonies brisées, Mauvezin, T.E.R. Trans Europ Repress, 1993.
"These analyses are first of all historical. They take up a debate, more than a century old, concerning epochs and the thresholds that
separate them. But rather than constructing the ages and their transitions-moments of objective Spirit, constellations of the veiling and unveiling of being,
epistemological apparatuses of knowledge/ power-I thought it useful to read the languages that Western philosophy has spoken since its birth. At their best,
philosophers have made an effort not to be carried away by the fad of the day that passes for common sense; no thought, however, has ever resisted being
carried away by its own language. Far from mastering a language, concepts live on it; they are born of words. Hasn't each of our historical idioms always
instituted its own fantasmic reality? I have asked myself which have been, concretely, those human additions of which Nietzsche speaks. Might they always come
down to a certain organization of nouns linked in one way or another to the predominant languages? Would "reality" then exist in a Greek, a Latin, a modern
vernacular? And might it be this by giving birth to the centuries that spoke those languages and relied upon common nouns as if upon courts of ultimate
authority that are essentially self-evident? It will be necessary, if such questions merit consideration, to define epochs by means of the fantasmic
organization instituted by a language." (p. 4)
"The history I will attempt to retrace is the one in which the Aristotelian hoson was maximized: the history of norms. I
understand this term in its strongest sense, the sense in which it names the authoritative representation that serves, during a given linguistic era, to
constitute the phenomenality of phenomena and thereby to legitimize all theoretical and practical rules. In the normative sense, a fantasm cannot be exhausted
in regulatory representations. It designates the sovereign principle to which the professional philosopher refers all laws of knowledge and acting, but which
in turn cannot be referred to anything else,' the principle that serves as the ultimate reason for all generic principles, the trans-regional canon for all
regional canons. This principle makes, absolutely though fantasmically, e pluribus unum-from many, one-not as does a major premise from which other
propositions would follow, but rather as a burgeoning production center. Fantasms rule by authorizing not the deduction of a finite corpus of conclusions, but
the indefinite association of representations that require that one follow them. Well, such representations are called laws. Hence if laws are
measured against the fantasmic authority, then this fantasmic authority will be normative in the sense that one refers to it as to the law of laws.
Is it not the basics of the trade to secure a foundation, not one that is grounded but one nevertheless capable of anchoring the premises
which instruct me in what I may know and what I should do? Understood in this way, a norm is not justified, and in this respect it is fantasmic. But it
justifies all that may become a phenomenon during the linguistic epoch that bears its hallmark; in this respect it is hegemonic. If it may be proven that such
a referent, non-referable to some superior authority, remains for as long as a language preponderates, then the history to be traced will be that of the Greek,
Latin, and modern hegemonic fantasms." (pp. 7-8)
"Because beginnings are compact but ends are revealing, I will read only the opening and closing documents of each linguistic epoch. I intend
to analyze the inaugural discourses that institute a law, as well as those that destitute it. When a fantasm attains hegemony, everything proceeds as if
philosophy had no other strategy to follow than natalit j–6Ý™ C–Ý™y alone, maximization, tragic denial. But all this is so only as if for the strategy
of mortality is never obliterated-singularization is not obliterated, neither is the tragic double bind. The instituting discourses already express the double
bind, and the destituting discourses will draw their final consequences from it.
I shall not stop to read instituted discourses that repeat the law for long periods. Therefore, I will say very little about the "one" as
manifested in fourth century Attic thought, nor will I hesitate, furthermore, to skip over the thirteenth century scholastic apex of the Latin fantasm, nor,
with the German fantasm, to take a shortcut in the trajectory from idealism to materialism and nihilism in the nineteenth century. If these philosophical
summits inspire awe it is because they closely resemble the knowledge a neurotic patient imputes to his therapist. And by presuming that each hegemonic fantasm
opens onto a non-fortuitous conjunction of legislation and transgression that are equally normative, the therapy effectively takes on the public function given
to those who are at the summits: ideal Platonic pacification, the Thomist "grand system" (if that is the summum of Latin thought), the Hegelian
dialectic reconciling all oppositions. But in a retrospective reading these cures prove deceptive. Neoplatonists, medieval nominalists, and phenomenologists of
occurrent being are there to remind us that there is no recovery from the tragic glimpsed at the beginnings.
Hence a warning about the relative volume of the synopses: In the following pages we shall read less about the moments of fantasmic
destitution than about those of institution, for at the commencement of each of the periods examined I will seek to isolate the fissure that ends up by
shattering an epochal symbolic order. The ends will prove to be, if not foreseeable, at least expected.
Through centuries of usage, a language deploys the full range of resources contained in its words. As a closing document for the Greek
regime, I will read a treatise by Plotinus describing the one as the event of unification which gathers the singular givens together. Here we will see a return
of the middle voice in which I will discern a law of impurity, a principle of contamination, an a priori of a counter-law which, by virtue of our
mortality, always disperses nomotheses among the singulars and time. Our limiting of the Greek one to its instituting and destituting moments should not be
construed to suggest that the language of Plotinus and Parmenides were the same. But what could that mean, the same language? We do not inhabit a language the
way a fossil is embedded in a monolith. Nevertheless, the semantic displacements from Parmenides to Plotinus were just shifts. By contrast, with the passage to
Latin, an abrupt deployment of contiguous territories took place, a rupture. As we shall see, these contiguities will require that we diachronically stretch
out the guiding thread, which is what our topology is. If we come upon thresholds of incommensurability in our history, these can only be the fractures left
behind by translations. The transition into a new linguistic epoch casts an aura of irreality on fantasmic "reality." Here my interest in languages is above
all aimed at rescuing the discussion of historical periodization from arbitrariness, which is why I shall pay attention to the great translators, to those who
shatter historical continuity-Cicero and Luther." (pp. 39-40).
Deely, John. 2001. Four Ages of Understanding. The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the
Twenty-First Century. Toronto London Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.
"It is not enough to distinguish the history of philosophy from philosophy, philosophical from exegetic problems, if we do not at the same
time realize that the history of philosophy is philosophy itself as so far actually realized in civilization. An exclusively synchronic development of
philosophical problems generates mainly a blindness to one's own presuppositions and to the manner in which historical context shapes in essential ways
contemporary consciousness - and unconsciousness - of basic philosophical problems. To see that there is more to be done is quite a different matter than
proceeding as if nothing had been done before us. Only an inclusive historical approach has even a ghost's chance of restoring perspective and balance, of
forcing the needed reassessment to a successful outcome.
My hope is that this book will help make it unconscionable for professors to continue to teach philosophy in the manner that has long become
customary - as though the history counted for nothing, or provided only a side-show, especially that part of its history I make known in this book as the Latin
Age, to which age, especially in its closing centuries (the period between Ockham and Poinsot or Descartes), we owe the general notion of sign taken for
granted today insofar as it is a warranted notion and not a mere nominalism. Besides, the history of philosophy is not only philosophy itself as realized in
civilization, but also a story, and a good one. Mates has suggested that to tell a story or even to criticize what others have said or done is incompatible
with the search for truth in history. I couldn't disagree more, for it is on narrative that we live as distinctively human animals, and every good narrative
has to have a beginning, a middle, and an end, however provisional. My aim has been to tell a 'story of philosophy' somewhere near as well as it deserves to be
told in order for something of the many truths at stake to come alive for those who happen to hear the tale - not the only one to be told, to be sure, but
still a story of philosophy in the grand manner such a story requires to match its destiny. I have tried to equip the reader, as it were, with seven-league
boots, making it possible to traverse twenty-four centuries in such a way as to obtain a vantage opening as far into the future of philosophy, I dare say, as
at least the lifetime of anyone born by the time of publication of this book. The last word in any history is never spoken till the race itself is extinct, and
not even then. So this is not a history for all time, but only for the first quarter or so, with luck the first half, of the twenty-first century; after which
the postmodernism of which it speaks as harbinger will be spoken of rather with words of hindsight and Minerva, according to the saying of Hegel, that the owl
of wisdom only flies toward evening." (from the Preface).
Weitz, Morris. 1988. Theories of Concepts. A History of the Major Philosophical Tradition. New York: Routledge.
"Having already canvassed open concepts, both contemporary formulations of them and some of their variety, most recently in The Opening
Mind: a philosophical study of humanistic concepts (1977), it seems to me that absolutely basic to further exploration in the area of conceptualization is
a thorough inquiry into the history of traditional theories of concepts. Such an inquiry would be valuable if only to test the accuracy of contemporary
criticisms of these theories as a series of mistaken views about concepts as entities, or concepts as erroneous readings of the meanings of words, or concepts
as unintelligible abstractions, or - my own view - concepts as closed in their definitive properties, conditions or criteria. Many contemporary philosophers,
whether they subscribe to open concepts or to concepts as dispositions, not entities, have offered one or other wholesale doctrine about traditional theories
of concepts. The doctrine, as attribution and as condemnation, in this regard, much resembles recent attempts to foist mistaken naming theories of words or
denotative theories of meaning and language on traditional philosophy, to be contrasted with some modern, correct theory of naming and meaning, put forth by
the particular philosopher-historian in question. Because much evidence by way of historical Analysis of traditional theories of language and meaning has it
companied and supported this contemporary critique of them, one would naturally suppose that similar evidence is available to indicate the wholesale
condemnation of traditional theories of concepts.
To my amazement and incredulity, I could find no book on the history of philosophical theories of concepts. There are, of course,
encyclopedia articles on CONCEPTS; however, these are, without exception, either too brief, too general or delinquent, contain too many inaccuracies and, on
the whole, simply repeat the historical cliches of their predecessors. Dictionaries, too, are unhelpful, as are the more detailed Etymologies and Lexicons.
What, then, of independently written essays or chapters of books on the different philosophers? Here, one finds a great deal on Kant's or Frege's theory of
concepts, and much on Aquinas' or Leibniz'. But there is nothing, except paragraphs in chapters of books or in essays, on Plato's theory of concepts and, even
more surprising, on Descartes', since he is preoccupied with what he refers to as 'concepts' when he turns from Meditation to Reply, for
example. And the little that there is on these two philosophers - that, for example, Plato's theory of concepts is that concepts are forms among the forms; or
that Descartes means by a concept a variant of an idea - it soon became apparent to me is incorrect.
To one, like myself, who is not a specialist in the history of philosophy, this whole business of an individual philosopher's theory of
concepts and of the history of theories of concepts, from Plato on, became confusing. The hope persisted that somewhere, someone -surely some German scholar,
whose colleagues had devoted their lives to Plato's theory of justice or to the etymology of arete - had written a long, accurate history of
philosophical theories of concepts.
That I could find no such survey dictated the writing of this book, entirely concerned with the history of philosophical theories of
concepts. If I am right in claiming that such a survey does not exist, then this history of philosophical theories of concepts is the first. And in this
regard, it will have realized one of its aims even if, disagreed with, in its parts or as a whole, it only provokes others to do the history better or
But, it may be asked, is this history needed ? Obviously, it seems so to me, first, because any important idea and related set of doctrines
about it that have a history enjoin and invite meticulous delineation of them. Second, no contemporary criticism of traditional theories of concepts nor, I
think, any putatively original and true theory of concepts and the having of them can long ignore the competing theories of the past. Recent claims about the
modernity of the dispositional theory of concepts are falsified and the truth of many variants of this theory are challenged by Plato's theory which, if my
interpretation of it is correct, is not only the first dispositional theory of concepts as abilities to move about intellectually and morally in the world, but
also the first to imply that concepts are such abilities only on the condition that these are closed, ultimately beholden to the forms or definitions of the
forms or of certain classes of things. However, the basic reason why a survey of theories is required -certainly the reason why I have devoted this book to it
- is that a philosopher's theory of concepts is not simply incidental to his work but fundamental in his philosophy in that it determines the overall condition
or criterion of what he takes to be the correct statements and solutions of his problems.
Why such a theory is needed perhaps also suggests why it has not yet been done: because such a survey, at least as I have conceived it, as a
history of the nature and role of concepts, not simply of their ontology, depends on the recent shift in philosophy itself from analysis to the elucidation of
concepts. For it is only when elucidation replaces analysis that one can generalize from the elucidation of particular concepts to the overall elucidation of
theories of concepts, both past and present. Thus, I have tried to understand the different theories of concepts, not to analyze or to recast the concepts
dealt with in the history of philosophy. What do philosophers say or imply concepts are in the concepts they employ? Do they subscribe to the doctrine that all
concepts, hence their conveying words, are governed by necessary and sufficient conditions or criteria? How do their theories play the roles they do in their
philosophies? These are the questions I have set myself.
But, it may also be asked: Is there a history of theories of concepts? Negative answers range from the denial that there are concepts and
therefore any theory of them, let alone a history of such theories, to the acceptance of at least concept-talk in the history of philosophy, some articulate
theories of concepts, but the rejection of anything as pi and as a history of theories of concepts.
If we distinguish, as we must, between Are there concepts? and What are concepts? the affirmative answer to the first, that concepts are
neutral intermediaries between words and things, irreducible to anything else, commits us to no affirmative answer to the second, as to what they are, whether
sensible, supersensible or neutral entities or dispositions. However, my answer and argument for it (given in chapter 1 of The Opening Mind) are not
relevant to the argument of this book: that there is a history of theories of concepts; that this history encompasses both explicit and implicit
theories; and that these theories, different as they are in their ontological answers to Introduction
what concepts are, concur in the major doctrine that all concepts are and must be governed by definitive sets of properties or criteria.
That there have been explicit theories of concepts cannot be denied, however these theories are assessed, as fabrications or as ontological
truths. Surely, Aquinas, Kant, Frege, and Moore, among many others, both affirmed concepts and theorized about their status and roles. What can be questioned
and denied is that these articulated theories point to a history of a single subject rather than, say, to the ambiguity of a 'concept,' in one language or
If this objection to a history of philosophical theories stands, it rules out not only my proposed history but all the Encyclopedia articles
as well that attempt to trace the history of the words for concept and explicit theories of them, which I question on grounds of inadequacy, not of dubiety.
What these articles show is that though 'concept' is ambiguous, theories of concepts are more multiple than ambiguous.
Indeed, this query about the history of philosophical theories of concepts as a single subject much resembles similar worries expressed by
those who question the very possibility of a history of (philosophical) theories of tragedy or morality. Here, too, the argument has been that there can be no
such history because there is no single subject. Tragedies differ and moralities are too diverse to yield any univocal meaning of 'tragedy' or 'morality.' All
the historian can do is to trace the diversity. It is therefore a conceptual illusion to suppose, for example, that Greek tragedy or Aristotle's theory of
tragedy and, say, modern tragedy or Schopenhauer's or Nietzsche's theory of tragedy, are historical points in the same continuum, that can then serve as a
single subject for the philosophical elucidation of tragedy. So, too with, say, Plato's theory of morality as against, say, Kant's. Here, too, critics of any
putative history of philosophical theories of morality stress that since Plato meant by 'moral' something entirely different from what Kant meant by 'moral,'
there cannot be any univocal history of the subject of philosophical theories of morality." (pp. XIII-XVI).
Arrington, Robert L., ed. 2001. A Companion to the Philosophers. Malden: Blackwell.
"The goal of this book is to present the thoughts and theories of the major figures in the dominant philosophical traditions throughout
history. To be sure, most of the essays are on "Western" thinkers, which label encompasses European, American and other English-speaking philosophers. But the
rich history of philosophical thought in India and China is well represented, by no means comprehensively so but in such a way as to convey a picture of major
trends of thought. Moreover, a representative sample of Japanese thinkers is included and philosophical thought in Africa is also represented. The concluding
section deals with some major Jewish and Islamic thinkers. Inevitably, such a project as this can only proceed selectively and an editorial task that must be
faced at the beginning is to choose figures that loom large in the editor's view of the history of philosophy. Obviously, not everyone will agree with this
I hope these essays will provide stimulating reading for those who sample them. They are written at a level that is appropriate for a reader
who is approaching these figures for the first time. But some philosophy is difficult and although an effort has been made to keep technical terminology and
mind-boggling argumentation to a minimum, some of the essays will stretch the minds of many readers. Stretching the mind, however. Is a major part of what
philosophy is supposed to do -- the results, one hopes, are deeper insights into the human condition.
A bibliography Is appended at the end of each essay. It gives a list of the major works of the philosopher under discussion in the essay and
it also indicates works written about the philosopher which will provide additional information and a deeper understanding of the figure.
The authors of the essays are authorities on the thinkers about whom they write. In most instances, they have written other essays or books
about the philosophers in question.
The essays in the book are grouped together in accordance with the philosophical traditions within which the thinkers are usually placed.
Sometimes, to be sure, the placement is a bit arbitrary. Spinoza, for instance, is included among the European and American thinkers, although he was a Jewish
philosopher. Similarly, Averroes and Avicenna are to be found in the section on Jewish and Islamic thinkers, although they are frequently studied as part of
Western philosophy. The location of an essay is largely determined by the distinctive tradition with which the thinker discussed primarily engaged. Spinoza,
for instance, was concerned first and foremost about the problems inherited from Descartes and the history of European philosophy: Averroes and Avicenna
engaged with a distinctive Islamic set of issues, although their philosophies were heavily influenced by earlier Western thinkers.
To assist the reader in tracing the lines of connection (historical and Intellectual) among the various philosophers, the names of other
thinkers whose work bears some significant relationship to the thought of the philosopher being discussed are given In small capitals. In the case of some of
the essays. peculiarities of style are indicated in the "guide to the entries" on the title page of the section." (from the Preface).
Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed. 1987. A History of Women Philosophers. Dordrecht: Springer.
Vol. 1: Ancient Women Philosophers, 600 B.C.-500 A.D (1987); Vol. 2: Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment Women Philosophers, 500-1600
(1989); Vol. 3: Modern Women Philosophers, 1600-1900 (1991); Vol. 4: Contemporary Women Philosophers, 1900-Today (1994).
"Two events led to the creation of our four-volume series on the history of women philosophers. The first occurred on a sweltering October
afternoon in 1980 when I sought comfort in the basement library of City University of New York's Graduate Center. I came upon a reference to a work by Aegidius
Menagius, Historia Mulierum Philosopharum, published in 1690 and 1692. I had never heard of any women philosophers prior to the 20th century with the
exceptions of Queen Christina of Sweden, known as Descartes' student, and Hildegard von Bingen, who lived in the 12th century. Two months later, the second
event occurred. I went to the Brooklyn Museum to see Judy Chicago's Dinner Party, a sculptural history of the achievements of women. Part of the
exhibit consisted of posters listing the names, nationalities and dates of birth of accomplished women, together with brief descriptions of their
accomplishments. Some of those listed were identified as "philosophers."
It took sixteen months to obtain a copy of Menagius' book. (A modern English translation of Mulierum by Beatrice Zedler (*), a
participant in the Project on the History of Women in Philosophy, is available through University Press of America.) Although Menage footnoted his sources, the
abbreviation conventions used by him made it difficult to duplicate his research. Little did I know then about the existence of reference works giving commonly
used abbreviations for early scholarly materials. My problem was compounded by the need to locate editions of the source materials that would have been
available to Menage. As it turns out, many of the women he listed as philosophers were astronomers, astrologers, gynecologists. or simply relatives of male
philosophers. Nevertheless, the list of women alleged to have been philosophers was impressive." (pp. IX-X).
"Research about the history of women philosophers has proceeded in several stages: first, creating a compendium of names, nationalities, and
dates of birth of women alleged to have been philosophers. Second, confirming or disconfirming the allegations. In the first stage of research, names appearing
in Menage's and Chicago's lists were checked in general encyclopedias, history books, encyclopedias and histories of philosophy, religion, astronomy,
mathematics. science, etc. Some of these entries would name other women alleged to be philosophers; names which would then be added to the list. Books about
"famous ladies" and "notable females" were read in full, yielding more new names, and frequently, biographical sketches and bibliographical information. As
word of the Project spread, new information about previously unknown women philosophers was received. Some of the information came from scholars who were later
to become collaborators in the Project; some came from well-wishers impressed by the scope and significance of our work. The same basic method of research was
used for the compendium-creating stage for all four volumes. But the methods of research for the second stage - confirming that the woman actually was a
philosopher - varied somewhat with each volume's research. Verifying information about pre-17th century women was much more difficult than verifying
information about modern and contemporary women philosophers. In order to locate reliable sources about the ancient and pre-modern philosophers, we frequently
relied on "free association" of the names with names of male colleagues, male relatives, subject headings for topics the women wrote about, or with names of
schools of philosophy and locations with which the women were associated." (pp. XIII-XIV).
(*) Gilles Méenage, The History of Women Philosophers, translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Beatrice H. Zedler, Lanham,
University Press of America, 1984.
Warren, Karen J. 2009. An Unconventional History of Western Philosophy. Conversations between Men and Women Philosophers. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield.
"This book is an outgrowth of what has come to be known as "the recovery project" in philosophy.
"The recovery project" refers primarily to those efforts to rediscover the names, identities, and philosophical contributions of women
philosophers whose existence has been virtually overlooked, neglected, ignored, or lost in the traditional or canonical account of the history of Western
philosophy, especially from 600 B.C.E. to 1600 C.E. It was initiated by philosophers who raised a simple but basic question that, at the time, had mostly not
been asked (despite how obvious the question seems now): "Could there really have been no women philosophers throughout the history of Western philosophy?"
They knew there had to have been women philosophers, but who were they?
Rediscovering these women philosophers has been a labor-intensive effort, undertaken by a handful of dedicated people. Mary Ellen Waithe's
pioneering work in the already classic four volume set, A History of Women Philosophers, was a decisive turning point in the generation of the names,
lives, and writings of many forgotten women philosophers (1) (see introduction to chapter 4). Many of the commentators in this textbook provided early
translations or commentaries on texts in Waithe's series; others published articles and books on individual women philosophers as part of the recovery
Their recovery work has generated an ever-burgeoning scholarly literature on women philosophers who currently are absent in the history of
Western philosophy (see appendix A). This recovery work in philosophy also continues to be important and actively engaged in by scholars. That this book
focuses on filling a critical gender omission in the history of Western philosophy by including women alongside their historical male philosopher
contemporaries neither diminishes the significance of the on-going recovery project work nor overrides the gratitude and admiration due those scholars who are
continuing the work, especially in this historically gender-exclusive field, philosophy, to which all contributors to this book have dedicated our professional
This book builds on the success of the recovery project by extending it to the inclusion of women philosophers with their historical male
philosopher contemporaries in each of the four main historical periods in the history of Western philosophy: ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary
philosophy. With the publication of this book it is no longer scholarly accurate, appropriate, acceptable, or necessary to describe, conceptualize, or teach
the history of Western philosophy without women." (from the Preface by K. J. Warren, XIII-XIV).
(1) See references to Mary Ellen Waithe in lead essay, note 3.
(2) See resources in lead essay, note 3.
Note 3. Four types of source materials were used or consulted for those portions of the book I wrote:
(1) Lecture notes from more than thirty years of teaching, primarily for the lead essay, on almost all the men and women philosopher pairs in
each chapter and for background philosophical content of the chapter introductions; (2) "recovery project" texts, primarily to learn about the women
philosophers in each chapter (and others in the history of Western philosophy), to write the biographies of the women philosophers and to generate the list of
women philosophers in appendix A; (3) Internet Websites, primarily for biographical information for the chapter introductions and the glossary; and (4)
secondary source material on or in the history of Western philosophy, primarily for those philosophers whom I have not taught.
(2) The "recovery project "material includes the following:
Alic, Margaret. Hypatia's Heritage: A History of Women in Science From Antiquity Through the Nineteenth Century (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1986).
Allen, Sister Prudence RSM. The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution, 750 B.C.-A.D. 1250 (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Freedman Publishing Co., 1985).
Allen, Sister Prudence RSM. The Concept of Woman, vol. 2, The Early Humanist Revolution, 1250-1500 (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Freedman Publishing Co., 2002).
Atherton, Margaret, ed. Women Philosophers of the Early Modern Period (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1994).
Barth, Else M. Women Philosophers: A Bibliography of Books Through 1990 (Bowling Green, OH:Philosophy Documentation Center,
Broad, Jacqueline. Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2002).
Dykeman, Therese Boos, ed. American Women Philosophers, 1650-1930: Six Exemplary Thinkers (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press,
Dykeman, Therese Boos, ed. The Neglected Canon: Nine Women Philosophers (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).
Gardner, Catherine Villanueva. Rediscovering Women Philosophers: Philosophical Genre and the Boundaries of Philosophy (Boulder, CO:
Gould, Vivian. Daughters of Time, 2000 Notable Women: Antiquity to 1800 (North Charleston, SC: Book Surge, 2005).
Kersey, Ethel M. Women Philosophers: A Bio-Critical Source Book (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).
McAlister, Linda Lopez, ed. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Special Issue on the History of Women in Philosophy 4, no. 1
Ménage, Gilles. The History of Women Philosophers trans. Beatrice H. Zedler (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984).
Rogers, Dorothy, and Therese Boos Dykeman , eds. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Special Issue on Women in the
American Philosophical Tradition, 1800-1930 19, no. 2 (Spring 2004).
Simons, Margaret A., ed. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Special Issue on the Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir 14, no. 2
Tougas, Cecile T., and Sara Ebenreck, eds. Presenting Women Philosophers (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2000).
Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed. A History of Women Philosophers, vol. 1, Ancient Women Philosophers 600 Bc-500 AD (Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijholf Publishers, 1987). Excerpts are published with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.
Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed. A History of Women Philosophers, vol. 2, Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment Women Philosophers
500-1600 AD (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1989). Excerpts are published with kind permission of Springer Science and Business
Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed., A History of Women Philosophers, vol. 3, Modern Women Philosophers 1600-1900 (Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1991). Excerpts are published with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.
Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed., A History of Women Philosophers, vol. 4, Contemporary Women Philosophers 1900-Present (Dordrecht,
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1995). Excerpts are published with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.
Warnock, Mary, ed. Women Philosophers (London: Orion Publishing Group, 1997).
(3) The Internet sites I consulted were: [omitted: the list is now obsolete]
(4) The secondary sources included:
Ayer, A. J., and Raymond Winch, eds. British Empirical Philosophers: Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and J. S. Mill (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1968).
Baird, Forrest E., and Walter Kaufmann. Twentieth-Century Philosophy, vol. 5 (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997).
Copleston, Frederick, SJ. A History of Philosophy, vols. 1-9 (New York: Doubleday, 1993).
Edwards, Paul, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vols. 1-8 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967).
Hornblower, Simon, and Anthony Spawforth, eds. Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
Lloyd, Genevieve, ed. Feminism & History of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Popkin, Richard H., ed. This Philosophy of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New York: Free Press, 1966).
Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972).
Solomon, Robert C. Introducing Philosophy: A Text with Integrated Readings, 8th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Ward, Julie K. ed. Feminism and Ancient Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1996).
Weitz, Morris, ed. Twentieth-Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition (New York: Free Press, 1966)." (pp. 23-25)
(from: Lead Essay: 2,600 Years of the History of Western Philosophy Without Women. THIS BOOK AS A UNIQUE, GENDER-INCLUSIVE
ALTERNATIVE by Karen J. Warren (pp. 1-26).