Bibliographia. Annotated Bibliographies (www.bibliographia.co)
by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc
Laerke, Mogens;, Smith, Justin E. H.;, and Schliesser, Eric, eds. 2013. Philosophy and Its History. Aims and Methods in the Study of Early Modern Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Verene, Donald Phillip. 2008. The History of Philosophy. A Reader's Guide. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
"Despite the aversion to the Western canon within the world of letters generally and the aversion to the study of the history of philosophy in particular, interest in the canon has prevailed. There are those who will not give it up and who still desire the education that the great works can provide. I am one of those who would wish to sail between the Scylla of analysis and the Charybdis of suspicion, with the desire to return to the Ithaca of the canon. To understand what I intend by the list of 100 great philosophical works in chapter 2, I refer the reader to my comments on the nature of a canon in the introductory chapter. The list of 100 great philosophical works is not intended as a perfect or a hard-and-fast list, and the overview or outline of the history of philosophy that follows the list, in chapter 3, is intended as an indication of the periods, figures, and major and minor works to be kept in mind in the study of the history of philosophy. I have presented this in schematic form. It does not purport to be a history of philosophy. For that one must go to the histories of philosophy listed at the end of the outline.
The outline is an interpretation of the history of philosophy. Because the canon has disappeared so much from our consciousness, the outline provides an overview, a reminder of what is there in the history of philosophy. The reader may wish first to look at the outline, then move on to the essays of part 2, and from them to come back to the outline as a guide to think through and absorb its order. The method of this book is not that of a linear argument. It is set up dialectically, with interplay between the two rhetorical forms of presentation, narratio and ratio, the narration (the essays) versus the list and outline. It may thus serve the reader as a touchstone and a guide to return to at various times-to enter the reading of works in the history of philosophy or to discover those works and movements of which perhaps the reader was not well aware.
The list of 100 great works and those works in the outline as well as the commentaries on them which are interspersed throughout the outline are drawn from the resources of my personal library. The commentaries are selected from ones I have used. Very likely there are glaring omissions. I have generally not included commentaries on individual thinkers, only works on periods or movements. It has not been my intention to write a textbook, taking a neutral position on the subject. This book is directed toward anyone who may have an interest in the history of philosophy and who may find what it presents useful.
This personal approach is evident in the three essays that follow in part 2. The first offers a view of philosophical reading and the philosophical use of language; the second a view of the origin of philosophy and the philosopher developed through the speculative use of the history of philosophy, moving from ancient to Renaissance to modern; and the third an exposition of how the philosophy of history affects the conception of the history of philosophy, using Vico and Hegel as holders of two views. These essays present rhetorical, humanist, and historical perspectives on the study and nature of philosophy and the history of philosophy. They are intended as suggestive rather than definitive accounts, with which the reader should feel free to disagree. As with the particular canon that each reader must develop from the larger, more general canon of the history of philosophy, each reader must come to some conclusions about the meaning of this history, about what aspects of it make it agile and alive.
Because some may wish not only to read the history of philosophy but also to write about it, I have included some practical advice on this topic in part 3, as well as a chapter on philosophical literacy containing 700 terms, names, and works that should be known or become known to those who study the history of philosophy and the field of philosophy generally. These are all taken from standard encyclopedias and reference works in philosophy. To my knowledge no one has as yet advanced such a literacy list in philosophy. It may interest the reader as a simple gauge of what should be philosophical common knowledge." (pp. XIII-XV).
Parkinson, George Henry Radcliffe, and Shanker, Stuart, eds. 1993. Routledge History of Philosophy. London, New York: Routledge.
Contents: Volume I: From the Beginning to Plato, Editor: C.C.W. Taylor; Volume II: Aristotle to Augustine, Editor: David Furley; Volume III: Medieval Philosophy, Editor: John Marenbon; Volume IV: The Renaissance and Seventeenth Century Rationalism, Editor G.H.R. Parkinson; Volume V: British Empiricism and the Enlightenment, Editor: Stuart Brown; Volume VI: The Age of German Idealism, Editor Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins; Volume VII: Metaphysics Under Attack: The Nineteenth Century, Editor: C.L. Ten; Volume VIII: Continental Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Editor: Richard Kearney; Volume IX: Philosophy of the English Speaking World in the Twentieth Century 1: Logic, Mathematics and Science, Editor S.G. Shanker; Volume X: Philosophy of the English Speaking World in the Twentieth Century 2: Meaning, Knowledge and Value, Editor: John Canfield.
"The Routledge History of Philosophy provides a chronological survey of the history of Western philosophy, from its beginnings up to the present time. Its aim is to discuss all major philosophical developments in depth, and with this in mind, most space has been allocated to those individuals who, by common consent, are regarded as great philosophers. But lesser figures have not been neglected, and it is hoped that the reader will be able to find, in the ten volumes of the History, at least basic information about any significant philosopher of the past or present. (...) In speaking of 'What is now regarded as philosophy', we may have given the impression that there now exists a single view of what philosophy is. This is certainly not the case; on the contrary, there exist serious differences of opinion, among those who call themselves philosophers, about the nature of their subject. These differences are reflected in the existence at the present time of two main schools of thought, usually described as ''analytic' and 'continental' philosophy. It is not our intention, as general editors of this History, to take sides in this dispute. Our attitude is one of tolerance, and our hope is that these volumes will contribute to an understanding of how philosophers have reached the positions which they now occupy. One final comment. Philosophy has long been a highly technical subject, with its own specialized vocabulary. This History is intended not only for the specialist but also for the general reader. To this end, we have tried to ensure that each chapter is written in an accessible style; and since technicalities are unavoidable, a glossary of technical terms is provided in each volume. In this way these volumes will, we hope, contribute to a wider understanding of a subject which is of the highest importance to all thinking people." (from the General Editors' Preface).
Copleston, Frederick. 2003. A History of Philosophy. London / New York: Continuum.
Contents: 1. Greece and Rome; 2. Medieval Philosophy; 3. Late Medieval and Early Renaissance Philosophy; 4. The Rationalists; 5. British Philosophy; 6. The Enlightenment; 7. German Philosophy; 8. Utilitarianisim to Early Analytic Philosophy; 9. French Philosophy; 10. Russian Philosophy; 11. Logical Positivism and Existentialism.
The original edition (first nine volumes) was published between 1946 and 1974; the tenth volume was added in 1986, and the eleventh is a collection of essays, already published with the title: Contemporary Philosophy Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism, New York, Continuum, 1956.
" How to Study the History of Philosophy.
1. The first point to be stressed is the need for seeing any philosophical system in its historical setting and connections.
This point has already been mentioned and does not require further elaboration: it should be obvious that we can only grasp adequately the state of mind of a given philosopher and the raison d'être of his philosophy if we have first apprehended its historical point de depart. The example of Kant has already been given; we can understand his state of mind in developing his theory of the a priori only if we see him in his historical situation vis-à-vis the critical philosophy of Hume, the apparent bank ruptcy of Continental Rationalism and the apparent certainty of mathematics and the Newtonian physics. Similarly, we are better enabled to understand the biological philosophy of Henri Bergson
if we see it, for example, in its relation to preceding mechanistic theories and to preceding French "spiritualism."
2. For a profitable study of the history of philosophy there is also need for a certain "sympathy," almost the psychological approach. It is desirable that the historian should know some thing of the philosopher as a man (this is not possible in the case of all philosophers, of course), since this will help him to feel his way into the system in question, to view it, as it were, from inside, and to grasp its peculiar flavour and characteristics. We have to endeavour to put ourselves into the place of the philosopher, to try to see his thoughts from within. Moreover, this sympathy or imaginative insight is essential for the Scholastic philosopher who wishes to understand modern philosophy. If a man, for example, has the background of the Catholic Faith, the modern systems, or some of them at least, readily appear to him as mere bizarre monstrosities unworthy of serious attention, but if he succeeds, as far as he can (without, of course, surrendering his own principles), in seeing the systems from within, he stands much more chance of understanding what the philosopher meant.
We must not, however, become so preoccupied with the psychology of the philosopher as to disregard the truth or falsity of his ideas taken in themselves, or the logical connection of his system with preceding thought. A psychologist may justly confine himself to the first viewpoint, but not an historian of philosophy." (pp. 8-9).
Popkin, Richard Henry, ed. 1999. The Columbia History of Western Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press.
"There have been many histories of philosophies, but few presented in one large volume for the educated layman. Two such ventures that have endured for many decades, The Story of Philosophy by Will Durant and Bertrand Russell's A History of Western Philosophy, are eminently readable, but cover only the high spots of the field.
Durant, who was a very popular lecturer on philosophy at Columbia University, primarily discusses only a few of the great men. Nevertheless, his popularization has been a gateway into philosophy for a great many readers during much of this century.
Russell wrote his book hastily out of financial desperation while jobless in New York City at the beginning of World War II. Since Russell was a scholar of very few of the topics he covered, and uninterested or hostile to others, his opus is most engaging as Russelliana but hardly as history of philosophy. Both Durant's and Russell's works are still in print and are widely available in paperback editions.
This work is not intended to compete with these classics. During the last half century the number of new serious scholarly findings and interpretations concerning various portions of the history of philosophy has increased enormously. Previously unknown materials by and about various major figures in the history of philosophy have been discovered. The manuscripts of important figures from ancient times to the present have been or are being edited, increasing our understanding of the authors.
For example, an edition of John Locke's writings based on previously unknown manuscripts has begun to see print; the edition of G. W. Leibniz's unpublished writings started in the 1920s continues to produce new volumes. New historical perspectives are being cast upon the materials, so that they can now be seen in their full intellectual and social contexts instead of as just isolated systems of ideas.
All of this has led to many multivolume histories of different portions of the history of philosophy. The enormous German Überweg history of philosophy, long the standard one for detail, is now in the process of being redone with a substantial increase in depth of coverage and amount of material; when completed, it will finally consist of dozens of highly specialized volumes. Large histories of various periods in the history of philosophy have also been issued, as well as countless volumes about individual philosophers.
In the light of all that has been discovered, edited, and reinterpreted, it seems appropriate to attempt to put together much of the new material and many of the new interpretations, as well as updated explanations and analyses of the accepted history of philosophy, in a form in which nonprofessional readers can appreciate the riches now available in the field. I have been concerned to give due attention to certain portions of the history of philosophy that much too often have been overlooked." (from the Introduction by R. H. Popkin, pp. XV-XVI).
Kenny, Anthony P. 2004. A New History of Western Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Contents: 1. Ancient Philosophy (2004); 2. Medieval Philosophy (2005); 3. The Rise of Modern Philosophy (2006); 4. Philosophy in the Modern World (2007).
"Why should one study the history of philosophy? There are many reasons, but they fall into two groups: philosophical and historical.
We may study the great dead philosophers in order to seek illumination upon themes of present-day philosophical inquiry. Or we may wish to understand the people and societies of the past, and read their philosophy to grasp the conceptual climate in which they thought and acted. We may
read the philosophers of other ages to help to resolve philosophical problems of abiding concern, or to enter more fully into the intellectual world of a bygone era.
In this history of philosophy, from the beginnings to the present day, I hope to further both purposes, but in different ways in different parts of the work, as I shall try to make clear in this Introduction. But before outlining a strategy for writing the history of philosophy, one must pause to reflect on the nature of philosophy itself. The word 'philosophy' means different things in divergent mouths, and correspondingly 'the history of philosophy' can be interpreted in many ways. What it signifies depends on what the particular historian regards as being essential to philosophy.
This was true of Aristotle, who was philosophy's first historian, and of Hegel, who hoped he would be its last, since he was bringing philosophy to perfection. The two of them had very different views of the nature of philosophy. Nonetheless, they had in common a view of philosophical progress: philosophical problems in the course of history became ever more clearly defined, and they could be answered with ever greater accuracy. Aristotle in the first book of his Metaphysics and Hegel in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy saw the teachings of the earlier philosophers they recorded as halting steps in the direction of a vision they were themselves to expound." (p. XI)
"Most histories of philosophy, in this age of specialization, are the work of many hands, specialists in different Welds and periods. In inviting me to write, single-handed, a history of philosophy from Thales to Derrida, Oxford University Press gave expression to the belief that there is something to be gained by presenting the development of philosophy from a single viewpoint, linking ancient, medieval, early modern, and contemporary philosophy into a single narrative concerned with connected themes. The work will appear in four volumes: the first will cover the centuries from the beginning of philosophy up to the conversion of St Augustine in ad 387. The second will take the story from Augustine up to the Lateran Council of 1512. The third will end with the death of Hegel in 1831. The fourth and final volume will bring the narrative up to the end of the second millennium."(p. XVIII)
"I shall attempt in these volumes to be both a philosophical historian and a historical philosopher. Multi-authored histories are sometimes structured chronologically and sometimes structured thematically. I shall try to combine both approaches, covering in each volume first a chronological survey, and then a thematic treatment of particular philosophical topics of abiding importance. The reader whose primary interest is historical will focus on the chronological survey, referring where necessary to the thematic sections for implication. The reader who is more concerned with the philosophical issues will concentrate rather on the thematic sections of the volumes, referring back to the chronological surveys to place particular issues in context." (p. XX - from the Introduction to the first volume).
Schrift, Alan D., ed. 2011. The History of Continental Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Volume 1: Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism: The Origins of Continental Philosophy, Edited by Thomas Nenon.
Introduction, Thomas Nenon; 1. Immanuel Kant's Turn to Transcendental Philosophy, Thomas Nenon; 2. Kant's Early Critics: Jacobi, Reinhold, Maimon, Richard Fincham; 3. Johann Gottfried Herder, Sonia Sikka; 4. Play and Irony: Schiller and Schlegel on the Liberating Prospects of Aesthetics, Daniel Dahlstrom; 5. Fichte and Husserl: Life-world, the Other, and Philosophical Reflection, Robert R. Williams; 6. Schelling: Philosopher of Tragic Dissonance, Joseph P. Lawrence; 7. Schopenhauer on Empirical and Aesthetic Perception and Cognition, Bart Vandenabeele; 8. G.W.F. Hegel, Terry Pinkard; 9. From Hegelian Reason to the Marxian Revolution, 1831-48, Lawrence S. Stepelevich; 10. Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Proudhon: "Utopian," French Socialism, Diane Morgan.
Volume 2: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy: Revolutionary Responses to the Existing Order, Edited by Alan D. Schrift and Daniel Conway.
Introduction, Daniel Conway; 1. Feuerbach and the Left and Right Hegelians, William Clare Roberts; 2. Marx and Marxism, Terrell Carver; 3. Søren Kierkegaard, Alastair Hannay; 4. Dostoevsky and Russian Philosophy, Evgenia Cherkasova; 5. Life after the Death of God: Thus Spoke Nietzsche, Daniel Conway; 6. Hermeneutics: Schleiermacher and Dilthey, Eric Sean Nelson; 7. French Spiritualish Philosophy, F.C.T. Moore; 8. The Emergence of Sociology and its Theories: From Comte to Weber, Alan Sica; 9. Developments in Philosophy of Science and Mathematics, Dale Jacquette; 10. Peirce: Pragmatism and Nature after Hegel, Douglas R. Anderson; 11. Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, 1840-1900, Gary Shapiro.
Volume 3: The New Century: Bergsonism, Phenomenology and Responses to Modern Science, Edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson and Alan D. Schrift.
Introduction, Keith Ansell-Pearson; 1. Henri Bergson, John Mullarkey; 2. Neo-Kantianism in Germany and France, Sebastian Luft and Fabien Capeillères; 3. The Emergence of French Sociology: Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Mike Gane; 4. Analytic and Continental Traditions: Frege, Husserl, Carnap, and Heidegger, Michael Friedman and Thomas Ryckman; 5. Edmund Husserl, Thomas Nenon; 6. Max Scheler, Dan Zahavi; 7. The Early Heidegger, Miguel de Beistegui; 8. Karl Jaspers, Leonard H. Ehrlich; 9. Phenomenology at Home and Abroad, Diane Perpich; 10. Early Continental Philosophy of Science, Babette Babich; 11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Fennell and Bob Plant; 12. Freud and Continental Philosophy, Adrian Johnston; 13. Responses to Evolution: Spencer's Evolutionism, Bergsonism, and Contemporary Biology, Keith Ansell-Pearson, Paul-Antoine Miquel and Michael Vaughan.
Volume 4: Phenomenology: Responses and Developments, Edited by Leonard Lawlor.
Introduction, Leonard Lawlor; 1. Dialectic, Difference and the Other: The Hegelianizing of French Phenomenology, John Russon; 2. Existentialism, S. K. Keltner and Samuel J. Julian; 3. Sartre and Phenomenology, William L. McBride; 4. Continental Aesthetics: Phenomenology and Antiphenomenology, Galen A. Johnson; 5. Merleau-Ponty at the Limits of Phenomenology, Mauro Carbone; 6. The Hermeneutic Transformation of Phenomenology, Daniel L. Tate; 7. The Later Heidegger, Dennis Schmidt; 8. Existential Theology, Andreas Grossmann; 9. Religion and Ethics, Felix Ó Murchadha; 10. The Philosophy of the Concept, Pierre Cassou-Noguès; 11. Analytic Philosophy and Continental Philosophy: Four Confrontations, Dermot Moran.
Volume 5: Critical Theory to Structuralism: Philosophy, Politics and the Human Sciences, Edited by David Ingram.
Introduction, David Ingram; 1. Carl Schmitt and Early Western Marxism, Christopher Thornhill; 2. The Origins and Development of the Model of Early Critical Theory in the Work of Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse, John Abromeit; 3. Theodor Adorno, Deborah Cook; 4. Walter Benjamin, James McFarland; 5. Hannah Arendt: Rethinking the Political, Peg Birmingham; 6. Georges Bataille, Peter Tracey Connor; 7. French Marxism in its Heyday, William McBride; 8. Black Existentialism, Lewis R. Gordon; 9. Ferdinand de Saussure and Linguistic Structuralism, Thomas F. Broden; 10. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Brian C. J. Singer; 11. Jacques Lacan, Ed Pluth; 12. Late Pragmatism, Logical Positivism, and their Aftermath, David Ingram.
Volume 6: Poststructuralism and Critical Theory's Second Generation Edited by Alan D. Schrift.
Introduction, Alan D. Schrift; 1. French Nietzscheanism, Alan D. Schrift; 2. Louis Althusser, Warren Montag; 3. Michel Foucault, Timothy O'Leary; 4. Gilles Deleuze, Daniel W. Smith; 5. Jacques Derrida, Samir Haddad; 6. Jean-François Lyotard, James Williams; 7. Pierre Bourdieu and the Practice of Philosophy, Derek Robbins; 8. Michel Serres, David F. Bell; 9. Jürgen Habermas, Christopher F. Zurn; 10. Second Generation Critical Theory, James Swindal; 11. Gadamer, Ricoeur, and the Legacy of Phenomenology, Wayne J. Froman; 12. The Linguistic Turn in Continental Philosophy, Claire Colebrook; 13. Psychoanalysis and Desire, Rosi Braidotti and Alan D. Schrift; 14. Luce Irigaray, Mary Beth Mader; 15. Cixous, Kristeva, and Le Doeuff: Three "French Feminists," Sara Heinämaa; 16. Deconstruction and the Yale School of Literary Theory, Jeffrey T. Nealon; 17. Rorty Among the Continentals, David R. Hiley.
Volume 7: After Poststructuralism: Transitions and Transformations, Edited by Rosi Braidotti.
Introduction, Rosi Braidotti; 1. Postmodernism, Simon Malpas; 2. German Philosophy after 1980: Themes Out of School, Dieter Thomä; 3. The Structuralist Legacy, Patrice Maniglier; 4. Italian Philosophy Between 1980 and 1995, Silvia Benso and Brian Schroeder; 5. Continental Philosophy in the Czech Republic, Josef Fulka, Jr.; 6. Third Generation Critical Theory: Benhabib, Fraser, and Honneth, Amy Allen; 7. French and Italian Spinozism, Simon Duffy; 8. Radical Democracy, Lasse Thomassen; 9. Cultural and Postcolonial Studies, Iain Chambers; 10. The "Ethical Turn" in Continental Philosophy in the 1980s, Robert Eaglestone; 11. Feminist Philosophy: Coming of Age, Rosi Braidotti; 12. Continental Philosophy of Religion, Bruce Ellis Benson; 13. The Performative Turn and the Emergence of Post-Analytic Philosophy, José Medina; 14. Out of Bounds: Philosophy in an Age of Transition, Judith Butler and Rosi Braidotti.
Volume 8: Emerging Trends in Continental Philosophy, Edited by Todd May.
Introduction, Todd May; 1. Rethinking Gender: Judith Butler and Feminist Philosophy, Gayle Salamon; 2. Recent Developments in Aesthetics: Badiou, Rancière, and Their Interlocutors, Gabriel Rockhill; 3. Rethinking Marxism, Emily Zakin; 4. Thinking the Event: Alain Badiou's Philosophy and the Task of Critical Theory, Bruno Bosteels; 5. Rethinking Anglo-American Philosophy: The Neo-Kantianism of Davidson, McDowell, and Brandom, John Fennell; 6. Rethinking Science as Science Studies: Latour, Stengers, Prigogine, Dorothea Olkowski; 7. European Citizenship: A Post-Nationalist Perspective, Rosi Braidotti; 8. Postcolonialism, Postorientalism, Postoccidentalism: The Past That Never Went Away and the Future That Never Arrived, Eduardo Mendieta; 9. Continental Philosophy and the Environment, Jonathan Maskit; 10. Rethinking the New World Order: Responses to Globalization/American Hegemony, Todd May; Chronology; Bibliography; Index.
Schürmann, Reiner. 2003. Broken Hegemonies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Translated by Reginald Lilly from the French Des hégémonies brisées, Mauvezin, T.E.R. Trans Europ Repress, 1993.
"These analyses are first of all historical. They take up a debate, more than a century old, concerning epochs and the thresholds that separate them. But rather than constructing the ages and their transitions-moments of objective Spirit, constellations of the veiling and unveiling of being, epistemological apparatuses of knowledge/ power-I thought it useful to read the languages that Western philosophy has spoken since its birth. At their best, philosophers have made an effort not to be carried away by the fad of the day that passes for common sense; no thought, however, has ever resisted being carried away by its own language. Far from mastering a language, concepts live on it; they are born of words. Hasn't each of our historical idioms always instituted its own fantasmic reality? I have asked myself which have been, concretely, those human additions of which Nietzsche speaks. Might they always come down to a certain organization of nouns linked in one way or another to the predominant languages? Would "reality" then exist in a Greek, a Latin, a modern vernacular? And might it be this by giving birth to the centuries that spoke those languages and relied upon common nouns as if upon courts of ultimate authority that are essentially self-evident? It will be necessary, if such questions merit consideration, to define epochs by means of the fantasmic organization instituted by a language." (p. 4)
"The history I will attempt to retrace is the one in which the Aristotelian hoson was maximized: the history of norms. I understand this term in its strongest sense, the sense in which it names the authoritative representation that serves, during a given linguistic era, to constitute the phenomenality of phenomena and thereby to legitimize all theoretical and practical rules. In the normative sense, a fantasm cannot be exhausted in regulatory representations. It designates the sovereign principle to which the professional philosopher refers all laws of knowledge and acting, but which in turn cannot be referred to anything else,' the principle that serves as the ultimate reason for all generic principles, the trans-regional canon for all regional canons. This principle makes, absolutely though fantasmically, e pluribus unum-from many, one-not as does a major premise from which other propositions would follow, but rather as a burgeoning production center. Fantasms rule by authorizing not the deduction of a finite corpus of conclusions, but the indefinite association of representations that require that one follow them. Well, such representations are called laws. Hence if laws are measured against the fantasmic authority, then this fantasmic authority will be normative in the sense that one refers to it as to the law of laws.
Is it not the basics of the trade to secure a foundation, not one that is grounded but one nevertheless capable of anchoring the premises which instruct me in what I may know and what I should do? Understood in this way, a norm is not justified, and in this respect it is fantasmic. But it justifies all that may become a phenomenon during the linguistic epoch that bears its hallmark; in this respect it is hegemonic. If it may be proven that such a referent, non-referable to some superior authority, remains for as long as a language preponderates, then the history to be traced will be that of the Greek, Latin, and modern hegemonic fantasms." (pp. 7-8)
"Because beginnings are compact but ends are revealing, I will read only the opening and closing documents of each linguistic epoch. I intend to analyze the inaugural discourses that institute a law, as well as those that destitute it. When a fantasm attains hegemony, everything proceeds as if philosophy had no other strategy to follow than natalit j–6Ý™ C–Ý™y alone, maximization, tragic denial. But all this is so only as if for the strategy of mortality is never obliterated-singularization is not obliterated, neither is the tragic double bind. The instituting discourses already express the double bind, and the destituting discourses will draw their final consequences from it.
I shall not stop to read instituted discourses that repeat the law for long periods. Therefore, I will say very little about the "one" as manifested in fourth century Attic thought, nor will I hesitate, furthermore, to skip over the thirteenth century scholastic apex of the Latin fantasm, nor, with the German fantasm, to take a shortcut in the trajectory from idealism to materialism and nihilism in the nineteenth century. If these philosophical summits inspire awe it is because they closely resemble the knowledge a neurotic patient imputes to his therapist. And by presuming that each hegemonic fantasm opens onto a non-fortuitous conjunction of legislation and transgression that are equally normative, the therapy effectively takes on the public function given to those who are at the summits: ideal Platonic pacification, the Thomist "grand system" (if that is the summum of Latin thought), the Hegelian dialectic reconciling all oppositions. But in a retrospective reading these cures prove deceptive. Neoplatonists, medieval nominalists, and phenomenologists of occurrent being are there to remind us that there is no recovery from the tragic glimpsed at the beginnings.
Hence a warning about the relative volume of the synopses: In the following pages we shall read less about the moments of fantasmic destitution than about those of institution, for at the commencement of each of the periods examined I will seek to isolate the fissure that ends up by shattering an epochal symbolic order. The ends will prove to be, if not foreseeable, at least expected.
Through centuries of usage, a language deploys the full range of resources contained in its words. As a closing document for the Greek regime, I will read a treatise by Plotinus describing the one as the event of unification which gathers the singular givens together. Here we will see a return of the middle voice in which I will discern a law of impurity, a principle of contamination, an a priori of a counter-law which, by virtue of our mortality, always disperses nomotheses among the singulars and time. Our limiting of the Greek one to its instituting and destituting moments should not be construed to suggest that the language of Plotinus and Parmenides were the same. But what could that mean, the same language? We do not inhabit a language the way a fossil is embedded in a monolith. Nevertheless, the semantic displacements from Parmenides to Plotinus were just shifts. By contrast, with the passage to Latin, an abrupt deployment of contiguous territories took place, a rupture. As we shall see, these contiguities will require that we diachronically stretch out the guiding thread, which is what our topology is. If we come upon thresholds of incommensurability in our history, these can only be the fractures left behind by translations. The transition into a new linguistic epoch casts an aura of irreality on fantasmic "reality." Here my interest in languages is above all aimed at rescuing the discussion of historical periodization from arbitrariness, which is why I shall pay attention to the great translators, to those who shatter historical continuity-Cicero and Luther." (pp. 39-40).
Deely, John. 2001. Four Ages of Understanding. The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century. Toronto London Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.
"It is not enough to distinguish the history of philosophy from philosophy, philosophical from exegetic problems, if we do not at the same time realize that the history of philosophy is philosophy itself as so far actually realized in civilization. An exclusively synchronic development of philosophical problems generates mainly a blindness to one's own presuppositions and to the manner in which historical context shapes in essential ways contemporary consciousness - and unconsciousness - of basic philosophical problems. To see that there is more to be done is quite a different matter than proceeding as if nothing had been done before us. Only an inclusive historical approach has even a ghost's chance of restoring perspective and balance, of forcing the needed reassessment to a successful outcome.
My hope is that this book will help make it unconscionable for professors to continue to teach philosophy in the manner that has long become customary - as though the history counted for nothing, or provided only a side-show, especially that part of its history I make known in this book as the Latin Age, to which age, especially in its closing centuries (the period between Ockham and Poinsot or Descartes), we owe the general notion of sign taken for granted today insofar as it is a warranted notion and not a mere nominalism. Besides, the history of philosophy is not only philosophy itself as realized in civilization, but also a story, and a good one. Mates has suggested that to tell a story or even to criticize what others have said or done is incompatible with the search for truth in history. I couldn't disagree more, for it is on narrative that we live as distinctively human animals, and every good narrative has to have a beginning, a middle, and an end, however provisional. My aim has been to tell a 'story of philosophy' somewhere near as well as it deserves to be told in order for something of the many truths at stake to come alive for those who happen to hear the tale - not the only one to be told, to be sure, but still a story of philosophy in the grand manner such a story requires to match its destiny. I have tried to equip the reader, as it were, with seven-league boots, making it possible to traverse twenty-four centuries in such a way as to obtain a vantage opening as far into the future of philosophy, I dare say, as at least the lifetime of anyone born by the time of publication of this book. The last word in any history is never spoken till the race itself is extinct, and not even then. So this is not a history for all time, but only for the first quarter or so, with luck the first half, of the twenty-first century; after which the postmodernism of which it speaks as harbinger will be spoken of rather with words of hindsight and Minerva, according to the saying of Hegel, that the owl of wisdom only flies toward evening." (from the Preface).
Weitz, Morris. 1988. Theories of Concepts. A History of the Major Philosophical Tradition. New York: Routledge.
"Having already canvassed open concepts, both contemporary formulations of them and some of their variety, most recently in The Opening Mind: a philosophical study of humanistic concepts (1977), it seems to me that absolutely basic to further exploration in the area of conceptualization is a thorough inquiry into the history of traditional theories of concepts. Such an inquiry would be valuable if only to test the accuracy of contemporary criticisms of these theories as a series of mistaken views about concepts as entities, or concepts as erroneous readings of the meanings of words, or concepts as unintelligible abstractions, or - my own view - concepts as closed in their definitive properties, conditions or criteria. Many contemporary philosophers, whether they subscribe to open concepts or to concepts as dispositions, not entities, have offered one or other wholesale doctrine about traditional theories of concepts. The doctrine, as attribution and as condemnation, in this regard, much resembles recent attempts to foist mistaken naming theories of words or denotative theories of meaning and language on traditional philosophy, to be contrasted with some modern, correct theory of naming and meaning, put forth by the particular philosopher-historian in question. Because much evidence by way of historical Analysis of traditional theories of language and meaning has it companied and supported this contemporary critique of them, one would naturally suppose that similar evidence is available to indicate the wholesale condemnation of traditional theories of concepts.
To my amazement and incredulity, I could find no book on the history of philosophical theories of concepts. There are, of course, encyclopedia articles on CONCEPTS; however, these are, without exception, either too brief, too general or delinquent, contain too many inaccuracies and, on the whole, simply repeat the historical cliches of their predecessors. Dictionaries, too, are unhelpful, as are the more detailed Etymologies and Lexicons. What, then, of independently written essays or chapters of books on the different philosophers? Here, one finds a great deal on Kant's or Frege's theory of concepts, and much on Aquinas' or Leibniz'. But there is nothing, except paragraphs in chapters of books or in essays, on Plato's theory of concepts and, even more surprising, on Descartes', since he is preoccupied with what he refers to as 'concepts' when he turns from Meditation to Reply, for example. And the little that there is on these two philosophers - that, for example, Plato's theory of concepts is that concepts are forms among the forms; or that Descartes means by a concept a variant of an idea - it soon became apparent to me is incorrect.
To one, like myself, who is not a specialist in the history of philosophy, this whole business of an individual philosopher's theory of concepts and of the history of theories of concepts, from Plato on, became confusing. The hope persisted that somewhere, someone -surely some German scholar, whose colleagues had devoted their lives to Plato's theory of justice or to the etymology of arete - had written a long, accurate history of philosophical theories of concepts.
That I could find no such survey dictated the writing of this book, entirely concerned with the history of philosophical theories of concepts. If I am right in claiming that such a survey does not exist, then this history of philosophical theories of concepts is the first. And in this regard, it will have realized one of its aims even if, disagreed with, in its parts or as a whole, it only provokes others to do the history better or differently.
But, it may be asked, is this history needed ? Obviously, it seems so to me, first, because any important idea and related set of doctrines about it that have a history enjoin and invite meticulous delineation of them. Second, no contemporary criticism of traditional theories of concepts nor, I think, any putatively original and true theory of concepts and the having of them can long ignore the competing theories of the past. Recent claims about the modernity of the dispositional theory of concepts are falsified and the truth of many variants of this theory are challenged by Plato's theory which, if my interpretation of it is correct, is not only the first dispositional theory of concepts as abilities to move about intellectually and morally in the world, but also the first to imply that concepts are such abilities only on the condition that these are closed, ultimately beholden to the forms or definitions of the forms or of certain classes of things. However, the basic reason why a survey of theories is required -certainly the reason why I have devoted this book to it - is that a philosopher's theory of concepts is not simply incidental to his work but fundamental in his philosophy in that it determines the overall condition or criterion of what he takes to be the correct statements and solutions of his problems.
Why such a theory is needed perhaps also suggests why it has not yet been done: because such a survey, at least as I have conceived it, as a history of the nature and role of concepts, not simply of their ontology, depends on the recent shift in philosophy itself from analysis to the elucidation of concepts. For it is only when elucidation replaces analysis that one can generalize from the elucidation of particular concepts to the overall elucidation of theories of concepts, both past and present. Thus, I have tried to understand the different theories of concepts, not to analyze or to recast the concepts dealt with in the history of philosophy. What do philosophers say or imply concepts are in the concepts they employ? Do they subscribe to the doctrine that all concepts, hence their conveying words, are governed by necessary and sufficient conditions or criteria? How do their theories play the roles they do in their philosophies? These are the questions I have set myself.
But, it may also be asked: Is there a history of theories of concepts? Negative answers range from the denial that there are concepts and therefore any theory of them, let alone a history of such theories, to the acceptance of at least concept-talk in the history of philosophy, some articulate theories of concepts, but the rejection of anything as pi and as a history of theories of concepts.
If we distinguish, as we must, between Are there concepts? and What are concepts? the affirmative answer to the first, that concepts are neutral intermediaries between words and things, irreducible to anything else, commits us to no affirmative answer to the second, as to what they are, whether sensible, supersensible or neutral entities or dispositions. However, my answer and argument for it (given in chapter 1 of The Opening Mind) are not relevant to the argument of this book: that there is a history of theories of concepts; that this history encompasses both explicit and implicit theories; and that these theories, different as they are in their ontological answers to Introduction
what concepts are, concur in the major doctrine that all concepts are and must be governed by definitive sets of properties or criteria.
That there have been explicit theories of concepts cannot be denied, however these theories are assessed, as fabrications or as ontological truths. Surely, Aquinas, Kant, Frege, and Moore, among many others, both affirmed concepts and theorized about their status and roles. What can be questioned and denied is that these articulated theories point to a history of a single subject rather than, say, to the ambiguity of a 'concept,' in one language or another.
If this objection to a history of philosophical theories stands, it rules out not only my proposed history but all the Encyclopedia articles as well that attempt to trace the history of the words for concept and explicit theories of them, which I question on grounds of inadequacy, not of dubiety. What these articles show is that though 'concept' is ambiguous, theories of concepts are more multiple than ambiguous.
Indeed, this query about the history of philosophical theories of concepts as a single subject much resembles similar worries expressed by those who question the very possibility of a history of (philosophical) theories of tragedy or morality. Here, too, the argument has been that there can be no such history because there is no single subject. Tragedies differ and moralities are too diverse to yield any univocal meaning of 'tragedy' or 'morality.' All the historian can do is to trace the diversity. It is therefore a conceptual illusion to suppose, for example, that Greek tragedy or Aristotle's theory of tragedy and, say, modern tragedy or Schopenhauer's or Nietzsche's theory of tragedy, are historical points in the same continuum, that can then serve as a single subject for the philosophical elucidation of tragedy. So, too with, say, Plato's theory of morality as against, say, Kant's. Here, too, critics of any putative history of philosophical theories of morality stress that since Plato meant by 'moral' something entirely different from what Kant meant by 'moral,' there cannot be any univocal history of the subject of philosophical theories of morality." (pp. XIII-XVI).
Arrington, Robert L., ed. 2001. A Companion to the Philosophers. Malden: Blackwell.
"The goal of this book is to present the thoughts and theories of the major figures in the dominant philosophical traditions throughout history. To be sure, most of the essays are on "Western" thinkers, which label encompasses European, American and other English-speaking philosophers. But the rich history of philosophical thought in India and China is well represented, by no means comprehensively so but in such a way as to convey a picture of major trends of thought. Moreover, a representative sample of Japanese thinkers is included and philosophical thought in Africa is also represented. The concluding section deals with some major Jewish and Islamic thinkers. Inevitably, such a project as this can only proceed selectively and an editorial task that must be faced at the beginning is to choose figures that loom large in the editor's view of the history of philosophy. Obviously, not everyone will agree with this selection.
I hope these essays will provide stimulating reading for those who sample them. They are written at a level that is appropriate for a reader who is approaching these figures for the first time. But some philosophy is difficult and although an effort has been made to keep technical terminology and mind-boggling argumentation to a minimum, some of the essays will stretch the minds of many readers. Stretching the mind, however. Is a major part of what philosophy is supposed to do -- the results, one hopes, are deeper insights into the human condition.
A Bibliography Is appended at the end of each essay. It gives a list of the major works of the philosopher under discussion in the essay and it also indicates works written about the philosopher which will provide additional information and a deeper understanding of the figure.
The authors of the essays are authorities on the thinkers about whom they write. In most instances, they have written other essays or books about the philosophers in question.
The essays in the book are grouped together in accordance with the philosophical traditions within which the thinkers are usually placed. Sometimes, to be sure, the placement is a bit arbitrary. Spinoza, for instance, is included among the European and American thinkers, although he was a Jewish philosopher. Similarly, Averroes and Avicenna are to be found in the section on Jewish and Islamic thinkers, although they are frequently studied as part of Western philosophy. The location of an essay is largely determined by the distinctive tradition with which the thinker discussed primarily engaged. Spinoza, for instance, was concerned first and foremost about the problems inherited from Descartes and the history of European philosophy: Averroes and Avicenna engaged with a distinctive Islamic set of issues, although their philosophies were heavily influenced by earlier Western thinkers.
To assist the reader in tracing the lines of connection (historical and Intellectual) among the various philosophers, the names of other thinkers whose work bears some significant relationship to the thought of the philosopher being discussed are given In small capitals. In the case of some of the essays. peculiarities of style are indicated in the "guide to the entries" on the title page of the section." (from the Preface).
Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed. 1987. A History of Women Philosophers. Dordrecht: Springer.
Vol. 1: Ancient Women Philosophers, 600 B.C.-500 A.D (1987); Vol. 2: Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment Women Philosophers, 500-1600 (1989); Vol. 3: Modern Women Philosophers, 1600-1900 (1991); Vol. 4: Contemporary Women Philosophers, 1900-Today (1994).
"Two events led to the creation of our four-volume series on the history of women philosophers. The first occurred on a sweltering October afternoon in 1980 when I sought comfort in the basement library of City University of New York's Graduate Center. I came upon a reference to a work by Aegidius Menagius, Historia Mulierum Philosopharum, published in 1690 and 1692. I had never heard of any women philosophers prior to the 20th century with the exceptions of Queen Christina of Sweden, known as Descartes' student, and Hildegard von Bingen, who lived in the 12th century. Two months later, the second event occurred. I went to the Brooklyn Museum to see Judy Chicago's Dinner Party, a sculptural history of the achievements of women. Part of the exhibit consisted of posters listing the names, nationalities and dates of birth of accomplished women, together with brief descriptions of their accomplishments. Some of those listed were identified as "philosophers."
It took sixteen months to obtain a copy of Menagius' book. (A modern English translation of Mulierum by Beatrice Zedler (*), a participant in the Project on the History of Women in Philosophy, is available through University Press of America.) Although Menage footnoted his sources, the abbreviation conventions used by him made it difficult to duplicate his research. Little did I know then about the existence of reference works giving commonly used abbreviations for early scholarly materials. My problem was compounded by the need to locate editions of the source materials that would have been available to Menage. As it turns out, many of the women he listed as philosophers were astronomers, astrologers, gynecologists. or simply relatives of male philosophers. Nevertheless, the list of women alleged to have been philosophers was impressive." (pp. IX-X).
"Research about the history of women philosophers has proceeded in several stages: first, creating a compendium of names, nationalities, and dates of birth of women alleged to have been philosophers. Second, confirming or disconfirming the allegations. In the first stage of research, names appearing in Menage's and Chicago's lists were checked in general encyclopedias, history books, encyclopedias and histories of philosophy, religion, astronomy, mathematics. science, etc. Some of these entries would name other women alleged to be philosophers; names which would then be added to the list. Books about "famous ladies" and "notable females" were read in full, yielding more new names, and frequently, biographical sketches and bibliographical information. As word of the Project spread, new information about previously unknown women philosophers was received. Some of the information came from scholars who were later to become collaborators in the Project; some came from well-wishers impressed by the scope and significance of our work. The same basic method of research was used for the compendium-creating stage for all four volumes. But the methods of research for the second stage - confirming that the woman actually was a philosopher - varied somewhat with each volume's research. Verifying information about pre-17th century women was much more difficult than verifying information about modern and contemporary women philosophers. In order to locate reliable sources about the ancient and pre-modern philosophers, we frequently relied on "free association" of the names with names of male colleagues, male relatives, subject headings for topics the women wrote about, or with names of schools of philosophy and locations with which the women were associated." (pp. XIII-XIV).
(*) Gilles Méenage, The History of Women Philosophers, translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Beatrice H. Zedler, Lanham, University Press of America, 1984.
Warren, Karen J. 2009. An Unconventional History of Western Philosophy. Conversations between Men and Women Philosophers. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
"This book is an outgrowth of what has come to be known as "the recovery project" in philosophy.
"The recovery project" refers primarily to those efforts to rediscover the names, identities, and philosophical contributions of women philosophers whose existence has been virtually overlooked, neglected, ignored, or lost in the traditional or canonical account of the history of Western philosophy, especially from 600 B.C.E. to 1600 C.E. It was initiated by philosophers who raised a simple but basic question that, at the time, had mostly not been asked (despite how obvious the question seems now): "Could there really have been no women philosophers throughout the history of Western philosophy?" They knew there had to have been women philosophers, but who were they?
Rediscovering these women philosophers has been a labor-intensive effort, undertaken by a handful of dedicated people. Mary Ellen Waithe's pioneering work in the already classic four volume set, A History of Women Philosophers, was a decisive turning point in the generation of the names, lives, and writings of many forgotten women philosophers (1) (see introduction to chapter 4). Many of the commentators in this textbook provided early translations or commentaries on texts in Waithe's series; others published articles and books on individual women philosophers as part of the recovery project.(2)
Their recovery work has generated an ever-burgeoning scholarly literature on women philosophers who currently are absent in the history of Western philosophy (see appendix A). This recovery work in philosophy also continues to be important and actively engaged in by scholars. That this book focuses on filling a critical gender omission in the history of Western philosophy by including women alongside their historical male philosopher contemporaries neither diminishes the significance of the on-going recovery project work nor overrides the gratitude and admiration due those scholars who are continuing the work, especially in this historically gender-exclusive field, philosophy, to which all contributors to this book have dedicated our professional lives.
This book builds on the success of the recovery project by extending it to the inclusion of women philosophers with their historical male philosopher contemporaries in each of the four main historical periods in the history of Western philosophy: ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary philosophy. With the publication of this book it is no longer scholarly accurate, appropriate, acceptable, or necessary to describe, conceptualize, or teach the history of Western philosophy without women." (from the Preface by K. J. Warren, XIII-XIV).
(1) See references to Mary Ellen Waithe in lead essay, note 3.
(2) See resources in lead essay, note 3.
Note 3. Four types of source materials were used or consulted for those portions of the book I wrote:
(1) Lecture notes from more than thirty years of teaching, primarily for the lead essay, on almost all the men and women philosopher pairs in each chapter and for background philosophical content of the chapter introductions; (2) "recovery project" texts, primarily to learn about the women philosophers in each chapter (and others in the history of Western philosophy), to write the biographies of the women philosophers and to generate the list of women philosophers in appendix A; (3) Internet Websites, primarily for biographical information for the chapter introductions and the glossary; and (4) some
secondary source material on or in the history of Western philosophy, primarily for those philosophers whom I have not taught.
(2) The "recovery project "material includes the following:
Alic, Margaret. Hypatia's Heritage: A History of Women in Science From Antiquity Through the Nineteenth Century (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986).
Allen, Sister Prudence RSM. The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution, 750 B.C.-A.D. 1250 (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Freedman Publishing Co., 1985).
Allen, Sister Prudence RSM. The Concept of Woman, vol. 2, The Early Humanist Revolution, 1250-1500 (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Freedman Publishing Co., 2002).
Atherton, Margaret, ed. Women Philosophers of the Early Modern Period (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1994).
Barth, Else M. Women Philosophers: A Bibliography of Books Through 1990 (Bowling Green, OH:Philosophy Documentation Center, 1992).
Broad, Jacqueline. Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2002).
Dykeman, Therese Boos, ed. American Women Philosophers, 1650-1930: Six Exemplary Thinkers (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1993).
Dykeman, Therese Boos, ed. The Neglected Canon: Nine Women Philosophers (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).
Gardner, Catherine Villanueva. Rediscovering Women Philosophers: Philosophical Genre and the Boundaries of Philosophy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000).
Gould, Vivian. Daughters of Time, 2000 Notable Women: Antiquity to 1800 (North Charleston, SC: Book Surge, 2005).
Kersey, Ethel M. Women Philosophers: A Bio-Critical Source Book (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).
McAlister, Linda Lopez, ed. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Special Issue on the History of Women in Philosophy 4, no. 1 (Spring 1989).
Ménage, Gilles. The History of Women Philosophers trans. Beatrice H. Zedler (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984).
Rogers, Dorothy, and Therese Boos Dykeman , eds. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Special Issue on Women in the American Philosophical Tradition, 1800-1930 19, no. 2 (Spring 2004).
Simons, Margaret A., ed. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Special Issue on the Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir 14, no. 2 (Fall 1999).
Tougas, Cecile T., and Sara Ebenreck, eds. Presenting Women Philosophers (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2000).
Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed. A History of Women Philosophers, vol. 1, Ancient Women Philosophers 600 Bc-500 AD (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijholf Publishers, 1987). Excerpts are published with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.
Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed. A History of Women Philosophers, vol. 2, Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment Women Philosophers 500-1600 AD (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1989). Excerpts are published with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.
Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed., A History of Women Philosophers, vol. 3, Modern Women Philosophers 1600-1900 (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1991). Excerpts are published with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.
Waithe, Mary Ellen, ed., A History of Women Philosophers, vol. 4, Contemporary Women Philosophers 1900-Present (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1995). Excerpts are published with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.
Warnock, Mary, ed. Women Philosophers (London: Orion Publishing Group, 1997).
(3) The Internet sites I consulted were: [omitted: the list is now obsolete]
(4) The secondary sources included:
Ayer, A. J., and Raymond Winch, eds. British Empirical Philosophers: Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and J. S. Mill (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968).
Baird, Forrest E., and Walter Kaufmann. Twentieth-Century Philosophy, vol. 5 (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997).
Copleston, Frederick, SJ. A History of Philosophy, vols. 1-9 (New York: Doubleday, 1993).
Edwards, Paul, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vols. 1-8 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967).
Hornblower, Simon, and Anthony Spawforth, eds. Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Lloyd, Genevieve, ed. Feminism & History of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Popkin, Richard H., ed. This Philosophy of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New York: Free Press, 1966).
Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972).
Solomon, Robert C. Introducing Philosophy: A Text with Integrated Readings, 8th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Ward, Julie K. ed. Feminism and Ancient Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1996).
Weitz, Morris, ed. Twentieth-Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition (New York: Free Press, 1966)." (pp. 23-25)
(from: Lead Essay: 2,600 Years of the History of Western Philosophy Without Women. THIS BOOK AS A UNIQUE, GENDER-INCLUSIVE ALTERNATIVE by Karen J. Warren (pp. 1-26).