Bogen, James, and McGuire, James E., eds. 1985. How Things Are. Studies in Predication and the History of Philosophy and Science.
Contents: Acknowledgements IX; James Bogen: Introduction 1; Robert G. Turnbull: Zeno's Stricture and Predication in Plato, Aristotle, and
Plotinus 21; Frank A. Lewis: Form and Predication in Aristotle's Metaphysics 59; Deborah K. Modrak: Forms and Compounds 85; Alan Code: On the Origins of Some
Aristotelian Theses About Predication 101; Frank A. Lewis: Plato's Third Man Argument and the 'Platonism' of Aristotle 133; Marilyn McCord Adams: Things versus
'flows', or Ockham on Predication and Ontology 175; Calvin G. Normore: Buridan's Ontology 189; James E. McGuire: Phenomenalism, Relations, and Monadic
Representation: Leibniz on Predicate Levels 205; Robert M. Adams: Predication, Truth, and Transworld Identity in Leibniz 235; Wilfrid Sellars: Towards a Theory
of Predication 285; Alan Code: On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses About Predication: Appendix on 'The Third Man Argument' 323; Notes on the
Contributors 327; Bibliography 329; Index of Labeled expressions 337; Name index 339; Subject Index 343-345.
Coffa, Alberto J. 1991. The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap to the Vienna Station. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dejnozka, Jan. 1996. The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins. Realism and Identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and
Quine. Lanham: Littlefield Adams Books.
Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted with further corrections, 2003.
Contents: Preface XI, 1. Introduction 1; 2. Is Frege a radical relativist? 3. Frege: existence defined as identifiability 103; 4. Russell's
robust sense of reality 123; 5. Russell's forty-four 'No-entity without identity theories 149; 6. The ancient realist basis of conceptual relativity 215; 7.
The ontology of the analytic tradition 233; Notes 273; Bibliography 305;Index of names 327; Index of subjects 333; About the author 337.
"The recent renaissance in Frege-Russell studies, though including some excellent work, has confined its quest for the origins of analytic
philosophy to the nineteenth century. My book goes well beyond Frege-Husserl comparisons and historical studies of Russell's idealistic upbringing to give a
philosophical evaluation of what the analytic movement really amounts to. My thesis is that a single kind of ontology, 'no entity without identity'
ontology, is fundamental to all of Russell's major works from 1900 to 1948, to the work of Frege, Wittenstein, and Quine -- and also to substance metaphysics,
its origin over two thousand years ago. Thus my aim is to show that the analysts, far from ending traditional ontology, at bottom continued and even developed
it. I cannot see how our understanding of the pluralistic, diverse analytic movement, not to mention the pluralistic, diverse history of Western philosophy,
could be more deeply transformed or unified, if I am right.
My methodology was to read the major books of the analysts, many of their lesser works, and a great deal of the secondary literature,
gleaning like Rachel in the field of wheat for anything I could find on 'no entity without identity', then to create from scratch new portraits of Frege and
Russell as the true analytic progenitors of this kind of ontology.
The specific thesis of my book is that there is a general kind of ontology, modified realism, which the great analysts share not only with
each other, but with most great Western philosophers. Modified realism is the view that in some sense there are both real and rational (or linguistic)
identities. In more familiar language, it is roughly the view that there are both real distinctions and distinctions in reason (or in language). More
precisely, it is the view that there is at least one real being which is the basis for accommodating possibly huge amounts of conceptual relativity,
or objectual identities' "shifting" as sortal concepts or sortal terms 'shift.' Therefore I hold that on the fundamental level of ontology, the
linguistic turn was not a radical break from traditional substance metaphysics. I also hold that the seeming conflict in the analysts between private language
arguments, which imply various sorts of realism, and the conceptual 'shiftability' of objects, which suggests a deep ontological relativity, is best resolved
by, and is in fact implicitly resolved by, their respective kinds of modified realism. There are many different sorts of modified realism, but all of them
share a common general form." (from the Preface).
Hill, Claire Ortiz. 1991. Word and Object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell. The Roots of Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Athens, Ohio:
Ohio University Press.
Contents: Abbreviations IX; Preliminary terminological comments XI; Glossary XIII; Acknowledgments XIV; Introduction 1; Part One: Logic,
realism and the foundations of arithmetic; 1. The argument that Frege influenced Husserl 7; 2. Husserl, Frege, and psychologism 13; 3. Sense, meaning, and
noema; 4. Husserl's 1891 critique of Frege 43; 5. Frege's review and the development of Husserl's thought 57; Conclusion: analiticity 91; Part Two: Conceptual
clarity. Introduction 99; 6. Intensions and extensions 103; 7. Presentation and ideas 125; 8. Function and concept 137; 9. On denoting 147; Conclusion: The way
things are 163; Notes 175; Bibliography 191; Index 215.
"As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's Philosophy of
Arithmetic is both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to logicize arithmetic
and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of the Basic Laws of Arithmetic in 1893. I hope to show that Husserl did so in terms that
would prefigure both the account Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of Principia
Mathematica. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and denotation that forms the basis of
Frege's logical project and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions indicate that these contradictions may have as serious consequences for
twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.
This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about
the transmission of Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the relevance of Husserl's early criticism of Frege's Foundations of
Arithmetic to some contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl the
phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to those members of the philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic.
This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's
Philosophy of Arithmetic and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that
Husserl flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying
the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and
his successors." (pp. 3-4).
———. 1997. Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
Hochberg, Herbert. 1978. Thought, Fact and Reference. The Origins and Ontology of Logical Atomism. Minneapolis: University of
Contents: Preface VII; Introduction IX; I. The analysis of perception 3; II. Idealism, realism and common sense 30; III. Thought and belief
53; IV. Moore and Bradley on particulars, predicates and predication 87; V. Names, individual concepts, and ontological reduction 122; VI. Frege's account of
reference and thought 147; VII: Russell's critique of Frege and the origins of the theory of descriptions 170; VIII. Descriptions, substitution, and
intentional contexts 198; IX. Existence, predicates and properties 231; X. Facts and possibilities 271; XI: Russell's theory of judgment and Sellars' critique
of it 309; XII: The structure of thought: Part I 347; XIII: The structure of thought: Part II 380; XIV. Logic fact and belief; XV. Difference, existence and
universality 444; Notes 457; Name index 485; Subject index 487-489.
"As with the idealists Moore and Russell opposed, facts have once again become unpopular. In defending the atomist's correspondence theory of
truth, I shall consider Frege's early attack on that theory as well as recent criticisms that reproduce, wittingly or unwittingly, the familiar idealistic
patterns. In returning to the idealist's arguments, some 'analytic' philosophers echo themes revived by Sartre, without providing the detailed argument of the
latter. By contrast, Sellars attacks atomism at a seemingly vulnerable point. He argues that the atomists did not and cannot resolve Bradley's puzzles about
predication. This is a dominant theme behind his attempt to defend the current revival of nominalism-a gambit he shares with Quine. It also reveals a link
between the new nominalism and the revival of idealism. Bradley's views thus affect a number of issues discussed, including the connection of Russell's theory
of descriptions with questions about concepts, particulars, predication, and judgment. This theory, in turn, provides an obvious link with Russell's critique
of Frege, which is explicated and defended. One of the surprising features of recent philosophy has been the unfair, unfounded, and often abusive commentary on
Russell's early work and, in particular, his criticism of Frege. Unfortunately, the prevalent assumption that Russell both misunderstood Frege and was guilty
of elementary errors has prevented an adequate understanding of the origin of his theory of descriptions and his analysis of judgment. The early critique of
Frege helps to clarify basic features of Russell's philosophy and reveals further connections with the views of Bradley and Moore. It is also crucial for the
comprehension of Russell's views about names, reference, existence, and truth. These are important for the analysis of intentional contexts presented in this
book. The examination of such fundamental aspects of Russell's philosophy naturally involves a consideration of recent criticisms of Russellian themes by
Strawson, Sellars, Carnap, Quine, and others.
What is attempted is the resolution of some issues that preoccupied Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore, and their successors, as well as an
explication of some links between Logical Atomism and Moore's early assault on idealism. The book is thus a partial study of the ontology and the history of
Logical Atomism." (from the Introduction).
Knuuttila, Simo, and Hintikka, Jaakko, eds. 1986. The Logic of Being. Historical Studies. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Introduction by Knuuttila and Hintikka: IX-XVI; Charles H. Kahn: Retrospect on the verb 'To Be? and the
concept of Being 1; Benson Mates: identity and predication in Plato 29; Russell M. Dancy: Aristotle and existence 49; Jaakko Hintikka: The varieties of Being
in Aristotle 81; Sten Ebbesen: The Chimera's Diary 115; Klaus Jacobi: Peter Abelard's investigations into the meaning and functions of the speech sign 'Est'
145; Hermann Weidemann: The logic of Being in Thomas Aquinas 181; Simo Knuuttila: Being qua Being in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus 201; Lilli
Alanen: On Descartes's argument for Dualism and the distinction between different kinds of Beings 223; Jaakko Hintikka: Kant on existence, predication, and the
Ontological Argument 249; Leila Haaparanta: On Frege's concept of Being 269; Index of names 291; Index of subjects 297-300.
"The last twenty years have seen remarkable developments in our understanding of how the ancient Greek thinkers handled the general concept
of being and its several varieties. The most general examination of the meaning of the Greek verb ' esti' ' einai' ' on '
both in common usage and in the philosophical literature has been presented by Charles H. Kahn, most extensively in his 1973 book The Verb 'Be' in Ancient
Greek. These discussions are summarized in Kahn's contribution to this volume. By and large, they show that conceptual schemes by means of which
philosophers have recently approached Greek thought have not been very well suited to the way the concept of being was actually used by the ancients. For one
thing, being in the sense of existence played a very small role in Greek thinking according to Kahn.
Even more importantly, Kahn has argued that Frege and Russell's thesis that verbs for being, such as ' esti', are multiply ambiguous
is ill suited for the purpose of appreciating the actual conceptual assumptions of the Greek thinkers. Frege and Russell claimed that a verb like 'is' or '
esti' is ambiguous between the 'is' of identity, the 'is' of existence, the copulative 'is', and the generic 'is' (the 'is' of class-inclusion). At
least a couple of generations of scholars have relied on this thesis and frequently criticized sundry ancients for confusing these different senses of '
esti' with each other. Others have found the distinction between the different Fregean senses in this or that major Greek philosopher, or otherwise
used the distinction as an integral part of their interpretative framework. Kahn's results show that all these lines of argument are highly suspect.
Independently of Kahn, Michael Frede (in his Habilitationsschrift published in 1967 under the title Prädikation and
Existenzaussage) reached the conclusion that Plato did not - at least not in the Sophist - accept anything like the Frege-Russell distinction,
thus striking another blow against the received views. We hoped to include excerpts of Frede's little classic here. Unfortunately, for reasons beyond our help
this turned out to be impossible." p. IX
"All these different investigations naturally raise the question: What is the origin of the Frege-Russell distinction? What is its
background? In her paper, 'On Frege's Concept of Being', Leila Haaparanta discusses Frege's treatment of being in its historical setting. One of the crucial
ingredients in Frege's treatment of being is his idea that existence is a second-level concept (property of a concept). Haaparanta sees the foundation of this
assumption in Frege's ideas about the identification (individuality) and existence of individuals (objects), incorporated in Frege's treatment of the senses by
means of which we can grasp an individual object. These were according to her inspired by Kant's ideas, especially by Kant's distinction between the
predicative and existential uses of 'is'. Even though Kant did not subscribe to or even anticipate the Frege-Russell distinction, he thus seems to have
inspired it." (pp. XV-XVI).
"Language, Mind, and Ontology." 1998. Philosophical Perspectives no. 12.
Edited by James E. Tomberlin
Contents: Part I: The Sixth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture. Tyler Burge: Computer Proof, Apriori Knowledge, and Other Minds 1; Part II:
Intensionality and Intentionality. Joseph Almog: The Subject Verb Object Class I 39; Joseph Almog: The Subject Verb Object Class II 77; Akeel Bilgrami: Why
Holism is Harmless and Necessary 105; Robert Brandom: Actions, Norms, and Practical Reasoning 127; Kirk Ludwig and Greg Ray: Semantics for Opaque Contexts 141;
Matthew McGrath: Proportionality and Mental Causation: A Fit? 167; Part III: Language, Ontology and Truth. Harry Deutsch: Identity and General Similarity 177;
Frank Jackson: Reference and Description Revisited 201; Mark Norris Lance: Some Reflections on the Sport of Language 219; Huw Price: Three Norms of
Assertibility, or How the MOA Became Extinct 241; Mark Richard: Commitment 255; Part IV: Rule-Following. C. B. Martin and John Neil: Rule and Powers 283; Scott
Soames: Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox 313; Part V: The Nature of the Mental. John O'Leary-Hawthorne and
Jeffrey K. McDonough: Numbers, Minds, and Bodies: A Fresh Look at Mind-Body Dualism 349; David Papineau: Mind the Gap 373; Timothy Williamson: The Broadness of
the Mental: Some Logical Considerations 389; Part VI: Consciousness and Qualia: A Symposium. Karen Neander: The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for
Representational Theories of Consciousness 411; Georges Rey: A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience 435; Michael Tye: Inverted Earth,
Swampman, and Representationism 459; William G. Lycan: In Defense of the Representational Theory of Qualia (Replies to Neander, Rey, and Tye) 479; Part VII:
Naturalism and Actualism: An Exchange. James E. Tomberlin: Naturalism, Actualism, and Ontology 489; Michael Devitt: Putting Metaphysics First: A Response to
James Tomberlin 499; Terence Horgan: Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics 503-509.
Allaire, Edwin B., ed. 1963. Essays in Ontology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Contents: Editor's Preface V; Authors' Note IX; Introduction XI; PROBLEMS. I. Edwin B. Allaire: Existence, Independence, and Universals 3;
II. Edwin B. Allaire: Bare Particulars 14; III. Herbert Hochberg: Elementarism, Independence, and Ontology 22; IV. Reinhardt Grossmann: Particulars and Time
V. Reinhardt Grossmann: Conceptualism 40; VI. Reinhardt Grossmann: Sensory Intuition and the Dogma of Localization 50; VII. Reinhardt
Grossmann: Common Names 64; SYSTEMS. VIII. Robert G. Turnbull: Ockham's Nominalistic Logic: Some Twentieth Century Reflections 79; IX. Edwin B. Allaire:
Berkeley's Idealism 92; X. Reinhardt Grossmann: Frege's Ontology 106; XI. Herbert Hochberg: Moore's Ontology and Non-Natural Properties 121; XII. Edwin B.
Allaire: The "Tractatus": Nominalistic or Realistic? Allaire 148; XIII. Herbert Hochberg: Of Mind and Myth 166; XIV. May Brodbeck: The Philosophy of John Dewey
188; Index 216.
AUTHORS' NOTE. Essays IV, VII, XII have not been previously published. The others appeared originally as follows: I. "Existence,
Independence, and Universals" in The Philosophical Review, 69, 1960, 485-496; II. "Bare Particulars" in Philosophical Studies, hi, 1963, 1-8; III.
"Elementarism, Independence, and Universals" in Philosophical Studies, 12, 1961, 36-43; V. "Conceptualism" in The Review of Metaphysics, 14, 1960, 243-254; VI.
"Sensory Intuition and the Dogma of Localization" in Inquiry, 5, 1962, 238-251; VIII. "Ockham's Nominalistic Logic: Some Twentieth Century Reflections" in The
New Scholasticism, 36, 1962, 313-329; IX. "Berkeley's Idealism" in Theoria, 29, 1963; X. "Frege's Ontology" in The Philosophical Review, 70, 1961, 23-40; XI.
"Moore's Ontology and Non-Natural Properties" in The Review of Metaphysics, 15, 1962, 365-395; XIII. "Of Mind and Myth" in Methodos, 11, 1959, 123-145; XIV.
"The Philosophy of John Dewey" in The Indian Journal of Philosophy, 3, 1961, 69-101.
"Certain words are crucial in ontological discourse. 'Exist', 'individual', 'particular', 'universal', 'simple', and 'independent' are
obvious examples. These essays examine how philosophers have used some of those words. The purpose of the examination is to make sense out of the ontological
doctrines in which the crucial words occur as well as out of the arguments that have been made for and against the doctrines. This common purpose is one good
reason for bringing the essays together. Nor is it the only one. The several essays share an awareness of the dialectical connections among the several issues
with which they deal. Also, the realism-nominalism issue is the central one; and the essays are all realistic. That is another good reason for bringing them
The authors believe that they share a method. If they are right, then there is a third good reason for bringing them together. But it seems
pointless to attempt here a statement of the method. A method is best judged by watching it in operation.
Even though the essays are all realistic, their defense of realism is both varied and complex. For this there are three reasons. First, none
of the essays defends uncritically any traditional position. Rather, each defends some proposition or propositions which by the method may be shown to be
connected with some traditional position. Second, they all put less weight on the proposition itself than on the intellectual motives which have led
philosophers to propound it and on the arguments by which they support it. Third, they all make a special point of exploring the dialectical ramifications of
the realism-nominalism issue. That is why the common purpose will be best served by allowing each essay to speak for itself." (Introduction).
Bottani, Andrea, Carrara, Massimiliano, and Giaretta, Pierdaniele, eds. 2002. Individuals, Essence, and Identity. Themes of Analytic
Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Bottani, Andrea, and Davies, Richard, eds. 2006. Modes of Existence. Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic. Frankfurt: Ontos
Carrara, Massimiliano, and Sacchi, Elisabetta, eds. 2006. Propositions. Semantic and Ontological Issues. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Centi, Beatrice, and Huemer, Wolfgang, eds. 2009. Values and Ontology. Problems and Perspectives. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Chalmers, David, Manley, David, and Wasserman, Ryan, eds. 2009. Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford:
Faye, Jan, Scheffler, Uwe, and Urchs, Max, eds. 2000. Things, Facts and Events. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Hochberg, Herbert, and Mulligan, Kevin, eds. 2004. Relations and Predicates. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Malinowski, Jacek, and Pietruszczak, Andrzej, eds. 2006. Essays in Logic and Ontology. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Morscher, Edgar, and Weingartner, Paul, eds. 1979. Ontology and Logic / Ontologie Und Logik. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Proceedings of an International Colloquium (Salzburg, 21-24 September 1976).
Mulligan, Kevin, ed. 1992. Language, Truth and Ontology. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Munitz, Milton K., ed. 1973. Logic and Ontology. New York: New York University Press.
Contents: Milton K. Munitz: Foreword V; Charles H. Kahn: On the theory of the verb 'To be' 1; Joseph Owens: The content of existence 21;
Jaakko Hintikka: Quantifiers, language-games and transcendental arguments 37; Alex Orenstein: On explicating existence in terms of quantification 59: Milton K.
Munitz: Existence and presupposition 85; Bas . Van Fraassen: extension. intension, and comprehension 101; Nino B. Cocchiarella: Whither Russell's paradox of
predication? 133; Fred Sommers: Existence and predication 159; Henry Hiz: On assertions of existence 175; Alvin Plantinga: Transworld identity or worldbound
individuals? 193; Nicholas Rescher: The ontology of the possible 213; Stephan Körner: Individuals in possible worlds 229; Hugues Leblanc: On dispensing with
things and worlds 241; Richmond H. Thomason: Perception and individuation 261; Peter T. Geach: ontological relativity and relative identity 287-302.
"The following essays represent the contributions to a seminar on ontology held under the auspices of the New York University Institute of
Philosophy for the year 1970-1971.
The possibility of establishing fruitful links between logic and ontology had already been made evident in earlier work by Frege, Lesniewski,
Russell, Quine, and Goodman. More recent investigations have sought to expand and deepen these studies, although by no means always through adhering to paths
previously established. Developments in modal logic, model theory, and presupposition-free logics have brought to the fore the need to deal with such central
concepts as 'existence,' 'possibility,' 'individuation,' 'identity,' and 'necessity,' among others. The studies here included, by some of the leading
investigators in the field, are typical of the most promising and exciting research of recent analytic philosophy. Along with those papers whose orientation to
ontology is derived primarily from the preoccupations of logicians, a number of additional studies are included that give testimony to the lively and creative
resurgence of interest in ontology in contemporary philosophy." (Foreword).
Munn, Katherine, and Smith, Barry, eds. 2008. Applied Ontology. An Introduction. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Poidevin, Robin Le, ed. 2008. Being. Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Poli, Roberto, and Seibt, Johanna, eds. 2010. Theory and Applications of Ontology. Dordrecht: Springer.
Vol. 1: Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 2: Computer Applications.
Poli, Roberto, and Simons, Peter, eds. 1996. Formal Ontology. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Contents: Foreword VII; Roberto Poli: Res, Ens and Aliquid 1; Nino B. Cocchiarella - Conceptual Realism as a Formal Ontology 27; Jerzy
Perzanowski: The Way of Truth 61; Fred Sommers: Existence and Correspondence-to-Fact 131; David M. Armstrong: A World of States of Affairs 159; Mieczyslaw
Omyla: A Formal Ontology of Situations 173; Karel Lambert: Attributives, their First Denotative Correlates, Complex Predicates and Free Logics 189; Liliana
Albertazzi: Formal and Material Ontology 199; Jean Petitot and Barry Smith: Physics and the Phenomenal World 233; Peter M. Simons and Charles W. Dement:
Aspects of the Mereology of Artifacts 255; Ingvar Johansson - Physical Addition 277; Index of names 289.
Schalley, Andrea C., and Zaefferer, Dietmar, eds. 2007. Ontolinguistics. How Ontological Status Shapes the Linguistic Coding of
Concepts. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Sen, Pranab Kumar, ed. 1983. Logical Form Predication and Ontology. Delhi: Macmillan India.
Smith, Barry, ed. 1982. Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
Valore, Paolo, ed. 2006. Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Milano: Polimetrica.